Once hailed as a self-made retail magnate with a taste for luxury real estate, Michel Ohayon’s empire now spirals under legal scrutiny and collapsed acquisitions. The story of his rise says much about ambition. The story of his fall, even more about excess and fragile foundations.
From Bordeaux boutique to billion-euro property
Michel Ohayon was born in Casablanca on July 7, 1961, and arrived in Bordeaux with his family during childhood. By the 1980s, he was running a franchise clothing store under the Daniel Hechter brand, gradually expanding it to 15 outlets. That early success was no accident. Ohayon saw retail as a way to control cash flow—and real estate as a way to create long-term capital.
His foundational move came in the 1990s. As commercial properties in Bordeaux lay undervalued, Ohayon bought a large building and rented it to brands like Zara and Gap. It turned profits quickly, and he repeated the strategy across French cities. That was the genesis of Financière Immobilière Bordelaise (FIB), which ultimately held assets in France and eight other countries.
| Key Assets Before 2022 | Acquisition Year | Estimated Value (EUR) |
|---|---|---|
| 26 Galeries Lafayette stores | 2018–2021 | Not disclosed |
| Go Sport | 2021 | 56 million (purchase) |
| Gap France | 2021 | Undisclosed |
| Cafés Legal | 2022 | Undisclosed |
| Luxury Hotels (Bordeaux, Versailles, Roissy) | 2014–2018 | >500 million |
Retail ambitions fuel rapid expansion
Through his holding Hermione People & Brands, Ohayon took aggressive steps between 2018 and 2021. When department stores struggled to adapt digitally, he doubled down, acquiring 26 Galeries Lafayette locations that employed about 1,000 people. He also bought national chains like Go Sport and revived interest in struggling retail names such as Gap France and Camaïeu.
The logic was scale. With enough mass and visibility, his conglomerate could leverage supplier contracts and mall-based foot traffic. For a while, this worked. But the entire ecosystem was sensitive to external shocks—and managerial missteps.
“He liked to say ‘Retail is muscle, real estate is the skeleton.’ But muscles get tired. Rents are fixed, debt isn’t light. And when Camaïeu folded, we knew something deeper was failing,” said a former executive from Hermione People & Brands who requested anonymity due to ongoing investigations.
The cracks begin to show
Camaïeu and Go Sport collapse
The first public sign came in September 2022, when Camaïeu was declared insolvent and liquidated, affecting 2,600 employees. Months later, in January 2023, Go Sport entered receivership under accusations of unpaid taxes and unaccounted intra-group financial transfers.
By February 2023, FIB itself filed for bankruptcy protection. The Galeries Lafayette stores followed, joining a safeguard procedure that initially confused observers expecting a standard receivership. This distinction mattered. The safeguard was meant to allow continued operations under court surveillance, offering hope to 1,000 employees clinging to their jobs.
A creditor lifeline—at a cost
In early 2024, the tide seemed to shift. The Galeries Lafayette parent company agreed to a restructuring deal: around €153 million in debt saw 70% wiped away, and the remainder rescheduled over a decade. The deal preserved the stores—for now. According to IADS, the agreement “secured operational continuity but left lingering questions about management oversight.”
- Camaïeu: liquidated with no buyer (Sept 2022)
- Go Sport: placed into receivership (Jan 2023)
- FIB: safeguard procedure begins (Feb 2023)
- Luxury hotels exit receivership (March 2024)
The legal dragnet tightens
Ohayon’s public downfall reached a new phase in April 2025. French financial police took him into custody in connection with Go Sport’s management. Charges include bankruptcy, misuse of corporate assets, and organized fraud. Press reports from Glitz Paris indicate that investigators are especially focused on cash transfers between subsidiaries and missing corporate records.
While a court authoritatively approved recovery plans for his InterContinental, Sheraton, and Versailles hotels—despite opposition from banks like Bank of China—the trust in his leadership has eroded. His sprawling group, which once employed 5,000 people, now resembles a collection of legal entanglements and distressed assets.
Public documents from La Connexion further highlight systemic failures in paying VAT and social contributions for several months leading up to the crises.
What led to the financial troubles of Michel Ohayon’s retail empire?
The fall of Ohayon’s empire stems from rapid expansion, over-leveraged acquisitions, and a fragmented management structure. Retail chains under-performed post-COVID, while luxury hotel revenue evaporated during lockdowns. He failed to maintain cash flow, missed VAT obligations, and faced growing pressure from creditors and labor groups.
How did Michel Ohayon’s business strategy evolve over the years?
He began with textile retail, switched to property-based investing in commercial buildings, and returned to retail at scale later. His second act leaned on synergies between real estate and retail, but it involved high debt exposure and risk concentration in struggling sectors.
What are the implications of the safeguard procedure for Michel Ohayon’s employees?
The safeguard policy avoided mass layoffs by freezing creditor actions and allowing continuation of activity. While this protected jobs in the short term, many employees remained uncertain about long-term stability due to ongoing restructurings.
How did the acquisition of Galeries Lafayette stores impact Ohayon’s business?
It was meant to be the crown jewel—1,000 employees, prime city-center locations, and a heritage brand. But integration was costly, and retail performance declined with inflation and digital competitors. This venture also added significant debt to his portfolio.
What role did the pandemic play in the downfall of Michel Ohayon’s retail empire?
Lockdowns crippled hotel income and killed momentum in physical retail. Consumer spending shifted online, foot traffic dwindled, and operational costs stayed the same. Recovery funds were poorly allocated, and the environment accelerated the exposure of existing structural flaws.
